Mars has fascinated us for centuries. Since the invention of the telescope, science fiction writers have mused over its habitability. Its location in the Solar System's habitable zone suggests it could, in theory, support life—despite lacking a global magnetic field and surface water. In a new paper, researchers propose that terraforming Mars is now an achievable goal. They outline methods for warming the planet, releasing pioneer species to build an ecosystem, and improving its atmosphere.
In recent years, humanity has visited several near-Earth asteroids (NEAs), including Ryugu (Hayabusa2) and Didymos (DART). However, we will need more frequent missions to start gathering more helpful information about this class of over 37,000 space rocks. CubeSats have off-the-shelf components and a relatively small size, making them a potentially good candidate for such an exploration program. But how would they reach these asteroid locations given their relatively limited payload and propulsion capacity? That is the focus of a new paper from Alessandro Quarta of the University of Pisa. He looks at potential trajectory planning for CubeSats given one of several configurations of ion drives. He shows how many NEAs can be accessed by simply entering a heliocentric orbit and awaiting the asteroid's arrival as part of its orbit.
I’m participating in the Heterodox Academy meeting in NYC on June 23-25, and its theme is “Truth, Power, and Responsibility.” The program for the entire meeting is here.
I’m on a rather daunting plenary panel on the 25th (below). The description:
The Duties and Responsibilities of Scholars | Wednesday, June 25 at 12:30-1:50pm What does it mean to be a scholar today—and who gets to decide? In an era marked by rising polarization, increasing public scrutiny of higher education, and shifting institutional expectations, the role of the scholar is more contested than ever. This plenary session brings together leading thinkers from across the academic spectrum to examine whether there are universal norms of scholarship that transcend disciplines, and what obligations scholars have not just to their fields, but to academia at large. This panel, featuring Jerry Coyne (University of Chicago), Jennifer Frey (University of Tulsa), Louis Menand (Harvard University), and John McWhorter (Columbia University), and moderated by Colleen Eren (William Paterson University), will explore where today’s academics derive their sense of duty, how those understandings are evolving, and what responsibilities come with the title of professor.I suppose I could just let the bigwigs do all the talking, but I do want to make a contribution. To do that, I’ve been reading quite a bit about academic freedom and free speech. I’ve discovered that they are two separate things, and that, if achieving truth is one’s aim, academic freedom is at least as important as free speech. In These are nascent ideas, so feel free to comment on them below.
First, let’s look briefly at free speech, which most scholars define this way:
Freedom of speech (according to America’s First Amendment): the prohibition of the government to suppress speech in public square. (There are of course exceptions, like harassment, false advertising, defamation, or creating imminent and predictable violence.)
There are three parts of the courts’ interpretation of First Amendment free speech:
a. There can be no content discrimination [A content-based law discriminates against speech based on the substance of what is communicated].
b. There are no true or false opinions for the purpose of the First Amendment. That is, everybody is entitled to their own opinion in all matters, both political and epistemic. This means that the ideas are given equal political consideration, but this doesn’t mean that all opinions are equally valid.
c. The state cannot compel you to speak. (This is outlined in Robert Posts’s engaging speech).
There are two reasons for a rational democracy to adopt freedom of speech. First, because a democracy is really government based on public opinion, as it’s ultimately based on votes. And, as we have learned, voters can sometimes have false or even harmful ideas. Second—and this is the philosophical underpinning of all freedom of speech laws—the freedom is supposed to create a “marketplace of ideas”, whose clash through public discussion and expression is supposed to be an essential route to finding TRUTH. But does it? My view is no: the truth is ultimately determined through academic freedom, which I construe broadly to encompass quasi-scientific investigation using evidence, but investigation not necessarily done by academics. I’ll discuss this in part 2 of the post, which I may or may not put up today.
The “marketplace of ideas” trope is based largely on the pronouncements of two men: John Stuart Mill and Oliver Wendell Holmes. I’ll give some of their quotes below about the value of the marketplace of ideas:
John Stuart Mill from on “On Liberty”
“He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side, if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion… Nor is it enough that he should hear the opinions of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them…he must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form.”
“The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.”
. . . . There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.
The beliefs which we have most warrant for, have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded. If the challenge is not accepted, or is accepted and the attempt fails, we are far enough from certainty still; but we have done the best that the existing state of human reason admits of; we have neglected nothing that could give the truth a chance of reaching us: if the lists are kept open, we may hope that if there be a better truth, it will be found when the human mind is capable of receiving it; and in the meantime we may rely on having attained such approach to truth, as is possible in our own day. This is the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being, and this the sole way of attaining it.
However unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.
I have long touted Mill’s tract as of supreme importance in justifying freedom of speech in a democracy. And I still think that, but I no longer agree that the clash of ideas among the public promotes or guarantees emergence of the truth. Something more is needed, and that something, as we’ll see, is evidence. Note that evidence is not mentioned by Mill.
From Oliver Wendell Holmes as quoted in the Annenberg Classroom:
In his dissent from the majority opinion in Abrams v. United States (upholding the Espionage Act convictions of a group of antiwar activists), U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes coins his famous “marketplace of ideas” phrase to explain the value of freedom of speech.
“[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas – that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.”
And from an article in Wikipedia: [In] the dissenting opinion by Supreme Court Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. in United States v. Schwimmer. Holmes wrote that “if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other, it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.’
Note that he doesn’t mention freedom of speech, but freedom of thought. Freedom of thought is not protected under the First Amendment:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
But does the clash of ideas in the public square produce truth (defined roughly as “something that conforms to fact or reality”) or knowledge (defined as “justified true belief”)? Again, the clash of ideas is necessary in a democracy so that the public can consider all sides of an issue before making decisions on who runs the government. We can argue later about whether certain non-elected parts of the government, like the Supreme Court, operate according to the First Amendment. They certainly don’t, as there is compelled speech—lawyers forced to answer questions—and not all ideas are considered equal.
Well, surely the clash of ideas is necessary to produce truth, but it’s not sufficient. Let’s take some examples.
One that immediately comes to mind is the clash between creationism and evolution. Everyone is entitled, via free speech, to espouse publicly one or another view in the public square (but not in the classroom). This is the vaunted clash of ideas. But did this clash produce truth per se? No, what eventually allowed evolution to overcome creationism is evidence, and that evidence doesn’t come from opinions, but from epistemic considerations. What empirical evidence do we have on the side of evolution (ahem, Why Evolution is True), and what evidence on the side of a supernatural hand in creationism? The evidence comes from scholars (or nonscholars employing scientific methods) gathering evidence under the principle of academic freedom: studying, thinking, and publishing what they want, using norms of scholarship and without outside interference. The finding of “truth” depends not only on a clash of ideas, but on the adducing of evidence by the opposing sides, along with the presumption that the public is rational and thoughtful enough to evaluate that evidence. (It apparently isn’t as judging by the most recent Gallup poll, which shows that 71% of Americans think that God had some had in evolution.)
Second, consider whether everyone is entitled to free government-provided health care, as in the UK and many other countries. Here we have an ongoing clash of ideas, which so far has resulted in an answer of “no” in America, though that could change. Which “truth” has resulted from this clash? Does the UK have the truth, or the US? The “truth” is that perhaps one of these is better for society than the other, but the clash of ideas itself won’t settle the issue, and even so there would be unresolvable disagreement about what “better” means. What we need is what we don’t have: a comparative experiment (or data) showing the effects of each choice in each society, AND a public that has a widely shared idea of what a “better society” means.
The second question in fact involves not just facts but values: what kind of society do we want? And while those values might be informed by a clash of ideas, they are based largely on unchangeable personal preferences. Often the clash of ideas rests heavily on morality, and, as I believe, there is no absolute morality and no “moral truth” (let’s put Biblical morality to the side here, since it’s not even clear that there is such a thing). Rather, morality is based on personal preferences, and in many cases (viz., the trolley problem), there is no truth: one simply adheres to one preference over another.
Here’s a third example: should society allow abortion? If some people have views on abortion that hinge on empirical facts, like whether a fetus has a heartbeat, can feel pain, or be viable if removed from the mother, then yes, those views can be informed by empirical investigation, also called “science”.
But there are many who favor an absolute prohibition of abortion because they consider it murder, murder of a potentially viable human being. Such people feel they are right, but morally right. Other people, like me, favor almost unrestricted abortion up to birth, simply because I believe that a society in which women have that choice is a better society than one in which abortion is forbidden or given time limits. But is the “truth” here? There is no truth: there is only people deciding what is morally permissible. Yes, we have a clash of ideas, and yes, it’s resolved in various ways in various states, but the resolution is a political one: a consensus of opinion and not a determination of “truth.” Again, I don’t see how that clash itself leads to the “truth”. It can lead to a political decision, but since this is largely an issue of preference, there is no truth to be had, no “conforming to what is reality.”
I maintain that most of the clashes of ideas we see in society deal with political or moral issues, hinging on preferences that cannot be adjudicated by argument alone. Some can be adjudicated by empirical investigation, but that is a minority.
In the end, while I believe that a clash of ideas is essential in a democracy simply to have a working democracy, the clash alone does not guarantee homing in on truths about the universe, and in many cases it can’t. In the cases where it can, the clash involves differing opinions about empirical issues. And it is the resolution of those issues by empirical data that will guide us toward the truth. Absent empirical evidence, which can result only from academic freedom (construed widely as the freedom to think, teach, and research), a mere clash of ideas cannot guide us to the truth.
“Give me your E. coli, your polio, your huddled Tuberculosis yearning to kill free.” Statue of Liberty, 2025 Originally I was not going to write a post this month. As this goes live, I am in Adelaide on a trip down under. When I was young, aka in my 50s, I would try and write a blog entry while traveling. It is […]
The post 1799 first appeared on Science-Based Medicine.Their exciting nature, combined with the fact nobody's ever won one, make paranormal challenge prizes important educational tools.
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